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Abstract:  Consistent with the promising proposal of Klein & Barron (K & B), we discuss how what 
makes us conscious appears to be distinct from and more widespread in the animal kingdom 
than what distinguishes us from other species. Many of the abilities that do distinguish humans 
from other species (e.g., syntax and co-articulation in speech production) can be mediated 
unconsciously. The kind of functional architecture proposed by K & B may engender an “action 
selection bottleneck” in both humans and nonhuman species. As noted by K & B, this bottleneck 
is intimately related to conscious processing. 
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Which neural circuits give rise to conscious states? To address this question, Klein & Barron 
(2016) (henceforth K & B) use the clever strategy of examining the most basic instantiations of 
these states, including in nonhuman species. Their innovative approach accords well with the 
conclusion, in vertebrate research, that these states are not a uniquely human phenotype. It has 
been proposed that, because of what is known today about the phylogenetic continuity of the 
vertebrate brain, the burden of proof is no longer to demonstrate that the higher mammals 
possess these states, but rather to demonstrate that these animals do not possess these states 
(see Gray, 2004; Panksepp, 1998). (This conclusion is arguably already warranted on ethical 
grounds alone.)   
In addition, the approach of K & B complements Passive Frame Theory (Morsella et al., in 
press), which (a) focuses on the most basic instantiations of these states (but only in humans) 
and (b) proposes that the primary function of these states is “low-level,” controlling basic, 
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“integrated” actions (e.g., holding one’s breath while underwater; Morsella, 2005). These kinds 
of actions are selected on the basis of integrating various different kinds of information, 
including perceptual information and information concerning bodily needs (e.g., visceral urges). 
In Passive Frame Theory, without consciousness, sophisticated behaviors (e.g., manipulating an 
object) can arise but the behaviors, being un-integrated, will not be influenced by all the kinds of 
information by which they should be influenced. In Passive Frame Theory, many of the 
properties of these states (e.g., the first-person vantage point) arise from the demands of 
adaptive action selection (see also Merker, 2013). 
As noted by K & B, the claim that nonhuman species X must possess conscious states 
because that species has a certain behavioral capacity depends on various assumptions. This is 
in part because, in the animal kingdom, the same behavioral capacity (e.g., navigating toward a 
stimulus) does not always stem from the same underlying mechanisms (e.g., vision vs. 
echolocation). Even within one species (e.g., humans), the same behavioral operation (e.g., the 
closing of the eyelids) can be carried out by more than one kind of mechanism (e.g., involuntary 
blinking versus intentional winking). If one accepts K & B’s assumptions, then one can appreciate 
that K & B’s (relatively) simple nonhuman model might provide unique insights about the neural 
underpinnings of consciousness. For example, their arthropod model might provide new data 
that can resolve the controversy regarding whether conscious states stem from cortical or 
subcortical structures. (Olfactory consciousness presents challenges for “subcortical” accounts 
of consciousness; Morsella et al., in press)  
In light of K & B’s proposal — in which conscious states are a phenotype shared by many 
species (including arthropods) — it is interesting to consider that many of the abilities that do 
distinguish humans from other species (e.g., syntax and co-articulation in speech production) 
are often mediated unconsciously or may even be consciously impenetrable. This suggests that 
what makes us conscious is distinct from and more widespread in the animal kingdom than 
what distinguishes us from other species. 
 
The Action Selection Bottleneck 
K & B propose that what makes us conscious is shared by other species who face similar 
challenges regarding the process of action selection. K & B note that one can perform only one 
action at a time (e.g., only utter one word at a time). Why do such limitations in the effector 
system introduce a bottleneck at the action selection stage of processing? According to Cushing 
et al. (in press), it is because for an overt behavior to be adaptive it must be “integrated.” In the 
architecture proposed by Passive Frame Theory, this means that the overt behavior must be 
influenced by the level of activation of each of the many (unconscious) response systems that 
are activated by the contents of the conscious field at one moment in time.  
This process has been referred to as “collective influence” (Morsella et al., in press), in 
which unconscious response systems of the skeletal muscle output system “sample” and are 
influenced by the contents of the entire conscious field. In such a functional architecture, a 
bottleneck arises. Action can only be selected sequentially because the summation of activation 
levels across response systems has to happen within a certain time window (see evidence for 
such a bottleneck in Pashler, 1993). According to K & B, such a bottleneck arises in both humans 
and arthropods; in both species, conscious states enable the bottleneck to function adaptively. K 
& B suggest that the neural underpinnings of such a bottleneck might be easier to investigate in 
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arthropods than in humans. If so, then their arthropod model might provide for consciousness 
research what Aplysia californica provided for the study of learning. 
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